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Abstract
Cultural trends and popularity cycles can be observed all around us, yet our theories of social
influence and identity expression do not explain what perpetuates these complex, often unpre-
dictable social dynamics. We propose a theory of social identity expression based on the opposing,
but not mutually exclusive, motives to conform and to be unique among ones neighbors in a so-
cial network. We then model the social dynamics that arise from these motives. We find that
the dynamics typically enter random walks or stochastic limit cycles rather than converging to a
static equilibrium. We also prove that without social network structure or, alternatively, without
the uniqueness motive, reasonable adaptive dynamics would necessarily converge to equilibrium.
Thus, we show that nuanced psychological assumptions (recognizing preferences for uniqueness
along with conformity) and realistic social network structure are both necessary for explaining how
complex, unpredictable cultural trends emerge.
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Introduction
Popular cultural practices come into and out of fashion. Researchers have observed boom-and-bust
cycles of popularity in music, clothing styles, given names, automobile designs, home furnishings,
and even management practices (Shuker, 2016; Richardson and Kroeber, 1940; Reynolds, 1968;
Sproles, 1981; Berger, 2008; Berger and Le Mens, 2009; Lieberson, 2000; Lieberson and Lynn,
2003; Robinson, 1961; Abrahamson, 1991; Zuckerman, 2012). Popularity cycles appear to be
driven by social influence, e.g., by people adopting the music that their friends listen to or that they
perceive as popular (Salganik et al., 2006; Salganik and Watts, 2008). At the individual level, peo-
ple are constantly looking for new ways to express their preferred social identities (Hetherington,
1998; Rentfrow and Gosling, 2006; Berger, 2008; Chan et al., 2012). The resultant social dynam-
ics do not typically converge to equilibrium. What are the social forces that lead to such perpetual
change and novelty?
Social pressure to conform is a powerful force when behavioral patterns across a society shift
in unison. Psychologists since Asch have recognized the remarkable strength of the conformity
motive, stemming from a fundamental goal to fit in as part of a social group (Asch, 1955, 1956;
Cialdini and Trost, 1998). People tend to feel uncomfortable about considering, holding, and
expressing beliefs that conflict with the prevailing views around them as well as about behaving
oddly, in ways that might expose oneself as an outsider to the group (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000;
Golman et al., 2016). Given the conformity motive alone, we might expect to observe convergence
to an equilibrium in which society becomes monolithic, yet instead we actually observe persistent
diversity.
Opposing the motive to conform is a similarly universal human need for uniqueness (Snyder
and Fromkin, 1980; Lynn and Snyder, 2002). While the desire to differentiate oneself clearly
works against the desire to blend in (Imhoff and Erb, 2009), Chan, Berger and van Boven (2012)
demonstrate that people simultaneously pursue assimilation and differentiation goals, aiming to
be identifiable, but not identical (see also Leibenstein, 1950; Robinson, 1961). Preferences for
idiosyncratic behavioral patterns can preserve diversity (Smaldino and Epstein, 2015). Still, the
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question remains why behavioral patterns often do not remain in a stable equilibrium with everyone
finding an optimal balance between distinctiveness and conformity. Why instead do behavioral
patterns go through perpetual change, with particular behaviors cycling into and out of fashion as
cultural trends play out?
Here, we show that along with conformity and uniqueness motives, a realistic network of social
interaction is a critical, necessary ingredient for complex social dynamics to emerge. Specifically,
we show that reasonable adaptive dynamics that would necessarily converge to a static equilibrium
given random interactions in a well-mixed pool of people instead typically enter random walks or
stochastic limit cycles, and thus never converge, when interactions are restricted to individuals’
local neighborhoods in their social networks.
A natural theoretical approach for investigating social influence on decisions is to use game
theory. The conformity motive in isolation would create a Keynesian beauty contest, in which what
is cool (like what is beautiful) is just what everybody else believes is cool (Keynes, 1936). The
uniqueness motive in isolation would create a congestion game, in which the objective is simply
to be distinct from as many other people as possible (Rosenthal, 1973). Both games are known
to be potential games, for which convergence to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is practically
guaranteed (Monderer and Shapley, 1996b,a). When both motives co-exist and the game is played
on a realistic social network, however, the dynamics are more complex.
Cultural trends can be modeled more realistically as the dynamics of a game on a social network
because social influence is mediated by a social network (Jackson and Zenou, 2015). Social influ-
ence on expressions of individual identity is transmitted whenever an individual observes another
person whom he would like to identify with, so the relevant social network is defined by directed
connections corresponding to observation. The connected components of the social network may
correspond to distinct social groups, each with its own emergent subculture.
The desire for uniqueness within one’s own social group should not be conflated with a desire
for differentiation across groups (Chan et al., 2012). In models of identity signaling, membership
in one group may be preferable to membership in another, and people want to strategically distin-
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guish themselves from those in the less favorable group; e.g., an upper class tries to distinguish
itself from the bourgeois while the bourgeois tries to imitate them (Berger and Heath, 2007). The
dynamic of differentiation and imitation has been hypothesized to lead to fashion cycles (Karni and
Schmeidler, 1990; Pesendorfer, 1995). This dynamic does not, however, preserve diversity within
groups. Desire for uniqueness is a necessary part of the explanation. Our model features in-group
conformity and uniqueness motives; it could be augmented with a desire for differentiation across
groups, but for parsimony we assume that people care only about their fit within their own groups.
Model 1: Social Identity Expression in a Well-Mixed Population
We model the expression of social identity as a game played by a population of N individuals. Let
us say there are d aspects (or dimensions) of identity. Each person i chooses an expression of his
identity xi ∈ {a..b}d, i.e., represented as a tuple of d integers from some interval. For example, in
the case of choosing a color to wear, three integers between 0 and 255 might correspond to shades
of red, green, and blue that mix together to form any color.
A person’s degree of conformity in the population depends on the distance between his ex-
pressed identity and the average (population mean) expression of identity, ‖xi − x¯‖. A person’s
degree of uniqueness in the population depends on the number of others who adopt the exact same
expression of identity as him, denoted as ni(X) where X is the entire population’s profile of ex-
pressed identities. Putting together conformity and uniqueness motives, we model person i’s utility
given the profile of expressed identities as
ui(X) = −‖xi − x¯‖2 − λni(X) (1)
where λ is a parameter that describes the strength of the uniqueness motive relative to the confor-
mity motive. This utility function describes a person whose goal is to be similar to everybody, yet
the same as nobody.
Over time people may change their expressions of identity to achieve higher utility. We need
4
not fully prescribe this process, but assume only that people make changes that increase their own
utility, in accordance with some better-reply dynamics (Monderer and Shapley, 1996b; Friedman
and Mezzetti, 2001).
Definition 1 (Better-reply dynamics). At any given time t, one person i may consider switching
from xi to x′i; he switches if and only if ui(X
′) > ui(X); and for each person i and any best
response x∗i (to X(t)), the expected time until person i considers switching to x
∗
i is finite.
The motivation for better-reply dynamics is that people are boundedly rational and adaptive.
They can see what the people around them are doing and can search for something better (my-
opically), but they do not instantaneously react to changes in other people’s behavior or anticipate
these changes before they occur. Many commonly assumed adaptive learning dynamics are partic-
ular specifications of better-reply dynamics.
Results: Social Dynamics in a Well-Mixed Population
Theorem 1. Suppose people derive utility from both their conformity and their uniqueness in the
population, as in Equation (1). Then any better-reply dynamics necessarily converges to a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium.
The proof is presented in the SM Appendix. It follows from Lemma 1 in the SM Appendix,
which identifies an exact potential function for this game. Two examples of Nash equilibria, among
many that exist, are shown in Figure 1.
Theorem 1 says that in a well-mixed population, in the long run we will not see popularity
cycles, perpetual change, or novelty. The fact that we do, in reality, observe popularity cycles,
perpetual change, and novelty suggests that we should consider a more realistic model. We now
consider the social dynamics that result from assuming that people care only about the expressed
identity of their immediate neighbors in their social network.
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Figure 1: Two Nash equilibria distributions of identity expression for populations of N = 100
individuals. We set λ = 1.5 for this illustration. (A) One-dimensional identity expression over the
domain {0..15}. (B) Two-dimensional identity expression over the domain {1..10}2. By symme-
try, the distributions can be shifted anywhere within these (or wider) domains, and many strategy
profiles give rise to the same population distributions. Even after accounting for these symmetries,
these Nash equilibria are not unique.
A B
Model 2: Social Identity Expression in Social Networks
A social network is described by an adjacency matrix A where aij = 1 if person i observes, and
thus cares about, person j’s expressed identity (and equals 0 if not). Let η(i) = {j : aij = 1}
denote the set of people that person i observes, i.e., his neighbors.
Conformity among one’s neighbors depends on distance from one’s neighbors’ average iden-
tity, x¯η(i). Uniqueness among one’s neighbors depends on the number neighbors who adopt the
same expression of identity as oneself, denoted n˜i(X; η(i)). Thus, we now model person i’s utility
given the profile of expressed identities X and his set of neighbors η(i) as
ui(X) = −‖xi − x¯η(i)‖2 − λ n˜i(X; η(i)). (2)
Results: Social Dynamics in Social Networks
Theorem 2. Suppose people derive utility from both their conformity and their uniqueness among
their neighbors in a social network, as in Equation (2) with λ > 1. Then there exists a social
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network adjacency matrix Aˆ such that no pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists and, thus, better-
reply dynamics never converge to an absorbing state.
Proof. By construction. We provide an example of a social network with N = 3 people that
illustrates the result. (Any larger social network that contains this network as an out-component
also suffices.) Let person 1 observe (only) person 2, person 2 observe (only) person 3, and person
3 observe (only) person 1.
Observe that the best response correspondence for each person is as follows:
x∗1 ∈ {x : ‖x− x2‖2 = 1}
x∗2 ∈ {x : ‖x− x3‖2 = 1}
x∗3 ∈ {x : ‖x− x1‖2 = 1}.
Each person wants to be one unit of distance away from the person he is observing. However, it is
impossible for all three people to simultaneously choose best responses because of the mathemat-
ical fact that odd-length cycle graphs are not 2-colorable.
Theorem 2 says that with only local interactions in a social network, perpetually changing
identity expression and popularity cycles become possible. Observe that the uniqueness motive is
critical for obtaining this result. If we were to eliminate the uniqueness motive by setting λ = 0,
then any homogeneous profile of expressed identities (with xi identical for all i) would be a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium, regardless of the social network structure. The uniqueness motive along
with the local interactions together allow for more realistic, complex social dynamics.
Still, Theorem 2 only provides an existence result constructed with a highly stylized, simplis-
tic social network. It does not tell us whether complex social dynamics typically emerge from
our model when people are connected by realistic social networks. We now use computational
modeling to explore the dynamics of our model on realistic social networks.
We used a variant of the Jin-Girvan-Newman algorithm (Jin et al., 2001) to create a sample of
100 directed social networks with a high level of clustering and community structure and limited
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out-degree (Material and Methods). For each of these social networks, we repeatedly computed
better reply dynamics based on the utility function in Equation (2) to see how often the dynamics
converged to equilibrium within 30, 000 time steps (Material and Methods). (We chose the cutoff
at 30, 000 time steps based on first computing the dynamics in the full, well-mixed population, for
which Theorem 1 tells us that they must converge, and finding that across 100 trials, the dynamics
always converged within 1600 time steps.) If the dynamics did not converge within 30, 000 time
steps, we classified them as non-convergent (for that trial).
Figure 2 shows snapshots of the dynamics on the first social network in our sample between
29, 000 and 30, 000 time steps. Very quickly (i.e., within just a few hundred time steps) everybody
adopts identities in the range {0..3}, but individuals continually change thereafter. We can see
considerable change in individual expressions of identity in each snapshot. The dynamics do not
converge.
On average, across all 100 social networks in our sample, the dynamics were non-convergent
for 99.9% of our trials. Figure 3 presents the results of 100 total trials for each of the 100 social
networks in our sample, showing the number of social networks having particular frequencies of
non-convergence. For each social network in our sample, the dynamics were non-convergent for
at least 95 out of the 100 trials. For 93% of the social networks, the dynamics never converged.
These results tell us that with local interactions on realistic social networks, the interplay of
conformity and uniqueness motives produces social dynamics for identity expression that are in-
deed typically non-convergent. People continually change their expressed identities, and certain
forms of expression come into and out of fashion in unpredictable cycles. Popularity cycles are
inherently unpredictable in the model because people typically have multiple better replies (and
even multiple best responses) to choose from in the face of most profiles of their neighbors’ iden-
tity expression. The multiplicty of paths the dynamics could take leaves room for idiosyncrasy.
The pattern of widespread non-convergence across the entire sample of social networks appears
to be robust to variations in the process of search for a better response (i.e., it can be random or
sequential), variations in the distribution and average level of out-degree in the social network
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Figure 2: Identity expression in social network #1 changing over time. Arrows point from an
individual to the people he observes. The shading of the nodes corresponds to each person’s
expression of identity, from xi = 0 if node i is white to xi = 3 if node i is black. Shown from left
to right at 29100, 29300, 29500, 29700 and 29900 time steps.
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Figure 3: Histogram showing the number of social networks for which we observe particular
frequencies of non-convergent trials.
(short of being fully connected, of course), and variations in the preference parameter λ (over the
range λ > 1), based on additional trials reported in the SM Appendix. The social network with ID
37 is the one that most frequently permits convergence to equilibrium. Figure 4 shows this social
network and one example of a Nash equilibrium on it.
Directed connections in the social network appear to play an important role in obtaining typi-
cally non-convergent dynamics. We explored the better-reply dynamics after inserting reciprocal
connections in all of our directed social networks and found that on these (now) undirected social
networks, the dynamics converged to equilibrium in 98.7% of our trials. (The dynamics con-
verged within 3000 time steps in over 97% of our trials, providing reassurance that findings of
non-convergence are fairly robust to allowing the dynamics more time to converge.) Intuitively,
directed connections in the social network make it possible that an individual’s changing expres-
sion of his identity imposes a negative externality on people who observe him, but who he does not
notice. The ripple effects may persist or fade, and in more realistic, more complex social networks,
they tend to persist indefinitely.
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Figure 4: Social network #37 in a Nash equilibrium. Arrows point from an individual to the
people he observes. The shading of the nodes corresponds to each person’s expression of identity,
from xi = 0 if node i is white to xi = 3 if node i is black.
Discussion
Our findings help us understand the role of social networks and local interaction in the dynamics
of cultural trends. Popularity cycles, perpetual change, and novel expressions of social identity
should be expected when people observe their neighbors in realistic, directed social networks and
care about being unique as well as fitting in. Such complex social dynamics of identity expression
are incompatible with simplistic assumptions disregarding social network structure or reducing
social influence to mere conformity pressure absent a desire to individuate oneself.
Recognition of conformity and uniqueness as opposing, but not mutually exclusive, motives
is also part of optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991; Leonardelli et al., 2010). However,
optimal distinctiveness theory posits that people form collective identities by choosing to asso-
ciate themselves with social groups, whereas our concept of social identity operates at the level
of the individual. In our view, collective identities emerge at the level of the group based on their
members’ individual identities. From the alternative, similarly valid perspective, we could propose
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that individual identities emerge from a psychological process of finding consonance between the
collective identities of the many groups that an individual affiliates with at any point in time. Con-
necting these perspectives requires deeper understanding of how people choose to associate with
or withdraw from social groups, how social network structure endogenously evolves. While this
integration remains beyond our present grasp, we find it useful to have complementary theories
aimed at different levels of social identity.
We use game theory and computational modeling here to describe social dynamics with math-
ematical precision. Social phenomena do not always reflect individual preferences (Schelling,
1969, 1971). Mathematical modeling helps us understand the relationship between individual mo-
tives and aggregate social dynamics when interactions generate nontrivial feedbacks. Our work
here is part of a tradition of formal modeling of social identity and fashion (Bikhchandani et al.,
1992; Miller et al., 1993; Strang and Macy, 2001; Bettencourt, 2002; Tassier, 2004; Acerbi et al.,
2012; Smaldino et al., 2012; Smaldino and Epstein, 2015; Smaldino et al., 2015). This approach
yields us deep theoretical insight, and we hope it inspires more research leading to further insights
into social dynamics and identity expression.
Materials and Methods
The Social Networks
We borrow Jin, Girvan, and Newman’s Model II algorithm for growing undirected social networks
(Jin et al., 2001) and modify it to generate directed social networks with N = 100 people, each of
whom can observe up to a maximum of 5 neighbors. The network is initialized with all 100 people
and no connections. The following three steps are then repeated 100 times:
1. Choose 3 pairs of individuals uniformly at random. For each pair i and j, if i observes less
than 5 people and does not already observe j, then i begins to observe j; else, if j observes
less than 5 people and does not already observe i, then j begins to observe i.
12
2. Randomly select triads i, j, and k such that i observes k and k observes j or that i and j both
observe k. If i observes less than 5 people and does not already observe j, then i begins to
observe j. (Real social networks exhibit both patterns of directed closure (Brzozowski and
Romero, 2011).)
3. Randomly select and break 0.5% of connections (rounded up).
All 100 social networks and the Python source code used to create them will be made available in
the SM Appendix.
The Game
Our computational model adopts the following specification of parameter values for the game:
d = 1; {a..b} = {0..199}; λ = 1.5.
The Better-Reply Dynamics
Our computational model adopts a specification of the better-reply dynamics in which at each time
step, one individual searches for (and upon discovery, adopts) a better reply to the current popu-
lation profile. Initial strategies are randomly (uniformly) distributed. We check for convergence
after every 200 time steps by sequentially checking whether any individual can find a better reply.
In the other time steps, the individual searching for a better reply is randomly selected. The Python
source code and complete output data will be made available in the SM Appendix.
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Supplementary Materials
Formal Definitions
We can express person i’s neighbors’ average identity as
x¯η(i) =
1
|η(i)|
∑
j∈η(i)
xj.
We can express the number of i’s neighbors who adopt the same expression of identity as person i
as
n˜i(X; η(i)) =
∑
j∈η(i)
δ(xi, xj),
where δ is the Kronecker delta function. In a well-mixed population, we set η(i) = {j : j 6= i} to
recover ni(X) for all i.
Supplementary Results and Proofs
Lemma 1. In a well-mixed population with utility functions given in Equation (1), the game has
an exact potential function:
Φ(X) = −
N∑
i=1
N − 1
N
‖xi − x¯‖2 + 1
2
λni(X).
Proof. Consider a change in the profile of identities X → X ′ resulting from person i alone chang-
ing his identity xi → x′i, i.e., such that x′j = xj for all j 6= i. We need only show that the change
in the potential function equals the change in i’s utility: Φ(X ′)− Φ(X) = ui(X ′)− ui(X).
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We express the change in the potential function as a sum of the changes in each term:
Φ(X ′)− Φ(X) =
N∑
j=1
N − 1
N
(‖xj − x¯‖2 − ‖x′j − x¯′‖2)+ N∑
j=1
1
2
λ (nj(X)− nj(X ′)) .
We consider each of the two summations separately.
We expand the first sum:
N∑
j=1
N − 1
N
(‖xj − x¯‖2 − ‖x′j − x¯′‖2) =
N − 1
N
(‖xi − x¯‖2 − ‖x′i − x¯′‖2)+∑
j 6=i
N − 1
N
(‖xj − x¯‖2 − ‖x′j − x¯′‖2) . (3)
We find it useful to express the average identity as x¯ = N−1
N
x¯−i + 1N xi. Plugging in to the first
term in Equation (3), we have:
‖xi − x¯‖2 − ‖x′i − x¯′‖2 =
(
N − 1
N
)2 (‖xi − x¯−i‖2 − ‖x′i − x¯−i‖2) .
Plugging in to the second term in Equation (3), expanding and canceling off common terms, we
have for any j 6= i:
‖xj − x¯‖2 − ‖x′j − x¯′‖2 =
1
N2
(‖xi − x¯−i‖2 − ‖x′i − x¯−i‖2)+ 2N (xj − x¯−i) · (xi − x′i).
Observe that the last term here drops out when we sum over all j 6= i because∑j 6=i(xj− x¯−i) = 0.
The first term does not depend on j, so summing over all j 6= i just multiplies this term by a factor
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of (N − 1). Putting it all together, we find that Equation (3) simplifies to:
N∑
j=1
N − 1
N
(‖xj − x¯‖2 − ‖x′j − x¯′‖2)
=
(
(N − 1)3
N3
+
(N − 1)2
N3
)(‖xi − x¯−i‖2 − ‖x′i − x¯−i‖2)
=
(
N − 1
N
)2 (‖xi − x¯−i‖2 − ‖x′i − x¯−i‖2)
= ‖xi − x¯‖2 − ‖x′i − x¯′‖2. (4)
Now, returning to the second part of the change in the potential function, we can use the formal
definition of nj(X) to write:
N∑
j=1
1
2
λ (nj(X)− nj(X ′)) = 1
2
λ
N∑
j=1
∑
k 6=j
(
δ(xj, xk)− δ(x′j, x′k)
)
.
The terms cancel whenever j 6= i and k 6= i, so we are left with:
N∑
j=1
1
2
λ (nj(X)− nj(X ′)) =
1
2
λ
(∑
j 6=i
(
δ(xj, xi)− δ(x′j, x′i)
)
+
∑
k 6=i
(δ(xi, xk)− δ(x′i, x′k))
)
= λ
∑
j 6=i
(
δ(xj, xi)− δ(x′j, x′i)
)
= λ (ni(X)− ni(X ′)) . (5)
Putting Equations (4) and (5) together, we have now shown that Φ(X ′) − Φ(X) = ui(X ′) −
ui(X).
Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 now follows from Lemma 1 by Monderer and Shapley’s argument (1996b).
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